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Abstract.
It is common knowledge that modern political societies, and to even greater extent contemporary 
ones, are characterized by pluralism. The term is used to describe situations which contain within 
the same society individuals and groups associated by various religions, various cultures, and various 
ethical systems. This is the consequence of several historical phenomena of widespread influence, 
which began in modern epoch and has intensified in the contemporary era, such as secularization, 
emigration, the establishment of democratic regimes in an even-larger number of states. The 
thesisdefended here is that the function of what Aristotle called the endoxa  today can be performed 
by human rights, that is by the statements contained in the great declarations of rights found in 
national constitutional documents and in charters of the great international organizations, such as 
the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization of African Unity, the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference, etc.
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Resumen. Filosofía y Derechos Humanos. 
Es sabido que las sociedades políticas modernas, así como a las contemporáneas aún en mayor medida, 
se caracterizan por el pluralismo. El término se utiliza para describir situaciones que contienen 
dentro de los individuos de una misma sociedad y grupos asociados de diversas religiones, culturas 
diferentes y diversos sistemas éticos. Esta es la consecuencia de varios fenómenos históricos de gran 
influencia, que se iniciaron en la época moderna y se ha intensificado en la era contemporánea, como 
la secularización, la emigración, el establecimiento de regímenes democráticos en un número aún 
mayor de-estados. La tesis defendida aquí es que la función de lo que Aristóteles llamaba la endoxa 
hoy puede ser llevada cabo por los derechos humanos, es decir por las declaraciones contenidas 
en las grandes declaraciones de derechos contenidas en los documentos de constitución y en los 
estatutos de las grandes organizaciones internacionales, como la de las Naciones Unidas, el Consejo 
de Europa, la Organización de la Unidad Africana, la Organización de la Conferencia Islámica, etc.
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1. Contemporary Pluralism
It is common knowledge that modern political societies, and to even greater extent 
contemporary ones, are characterized by pluralism. The term is used to describe situations 
which contain within the same society individuals and groups associated by various 
religions, various cultures, and various ethical systems. This is the consequence of several 
historical phenomena of widespread influence, which began in modern epoch and has 
intensified in the contemporary era, such as secularization, emigration, the establishment 
of democratic regimes in an even-larger number of states. Secularization, understood as 
the emancipation of ever larger numbers of spheres of human activity (ethics, politics, 
economics, even the arts and culture generally) from the influence of religion, in particular 
in Europe from the influence of the Christian religion, is a phenomenon that began at 
the beginning of the modern era, has developed rapidly and is now nearly complete. It 
has made Christian ethics lose a large part of its past influence and has not produced an 
alternative, universally shared ethical system.
Emigration, because of economic factors, the most important aspect of which today is 
what is known as globalization, that is the interdependence of the economy of every single 
country of the planet on those of all the others, has induced a large part of the world’s 
population to move from one society to another, losing some of their national, religious, and 
cultural connotations, while at the same time injecting entirely news ways of life and ways 
of thinking into the societies into which they have moved and taken their place alongside 
those who were already there. For example, the emigration of millions of people from 
North Africa ant the Near East, generally Muslim, into the originally Christian Europe has 
led both Christian and Muslim practices, customs, and moral behaviour to live alongside 
one another in numerous European cities. Finally, the establishment of democratic regimes 
in Europe, North and South America, and in parts of Africa and Asia has required respect 
for freedom of religion, conscience, and behaviour for individuals and groups inspired by 
different religions and different moral ideas, creating in this way extremely diversified and 
heterogeneous ethical points of view.
In the meanwhile, in modern and contemporary societies, the need for a public ethic 
is ever more pressing, that is an ethic on which legislative norms and rules can be based, 
so as to provide not only for a civil life among individuals and groups, but also able to 
deal with problems raised by scientific and technological progress, such as the problems 
of bioethics, environmental ethics, and economic ethics. Since all legislation requires the 
consensus of the majority, and its effectiveness is greatly influenced by the consensus of the 
minority, this makes it necessary to identify a general foundation of values common to the 
largest number of individuals and groups possible of those that form the political society. 
Satisfying this need clearly contrasts with the religious, cultural, and ideological pluralism 
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that characterizes contemporary society, but it cannot be put off indefinitely and so calls 
for the prompt discovery of a set of common values.
2. Human Rights and the Contemporary Debate on Ethics
The problem that I would like to discuss is: is it possible today to identify a truly universalistic 
ethic, that is one not tied to a particular community or tradition, but shared by all, and at 
the same time not formalistic, that is capable of promoting defined values? The thesis that 
I propose is that this is the ethic implicit in what are called “human rights”, which clearly 
presuppose a defined conception of man, according to which every human being possesses 
defined rights, that is a defined content, which must be recognized, and the opportunity 
to realize this content must be guaranteed. It is a universalistic ethic, because – as we will 
see shortly – de facto it is shared by all, despite membership in a particular community, 
culture or civilization. But it is also a non formalistic ethics, because at its basis there is an 
idea of “common good”, understood as the full realization, for every human being, of all 
the abilities that he/she effectively possesses, that is a “fulfilment” or, what has been called 
a “flourishing life”1.
Anyway before addressing the topic of human rights, allow me to make a brief 
methodological digression. In the renewed interest in ethics that has characterized the 
philosophical culture of the second half of the twentieth century, produced, on the one 
hand, by evaluative and directional incapacity of the social sciences, on the other, by the 
emergence of always new moral problems as a consequence of scientific and technological 
development, one of the authors who has attracted the most attention among the moral 
philosophers is, as is well-known, Aristotle, thanks to its attempt to build a “practical 
philosophy”, endowed with this own rationality and at the same time capable of directing 
not only the praxis of the individual but also of society. In Aristotelian practical philosophy, 
which for various raisons I hold is no longer tenable, there is a methodological aspect that 
merits attention for the problem described above, that is the problem of establishing the 
foundations of a sufficiently widely shared public ethics.
In Nichomachean Ethics, in fact, the Greek philosopher describes a method that is 
convenient to adopt for solving the problems connected to the evaluation of virtues and 
vices. It consists first of all in the exposition of the most important opinions connected to 
each problem (Aristotle says phainomena, meaning by this term that which is considered 
to be true by various individuals or groups, that is “views”); then in the development of the 
“apories”, that is the deduction of the consequences that derive from the opposed solutions 
1 Exponents of this conception today are the philosopher Martha Nussbaum, ant the economist Amartya 
Sen, from whom the quotations come. Cfr: A. K. Sen, On Ethics and Economics, Blackwell, Oxford 
1988; M.C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986.
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of a particular problem; finally in the adoption of those opinions that are demonstrated to 
be able not only to resolve all the connected difficulties to their consequences, but also and 
more importantly “to allow to survive” the endoxa, either in their entirety, or at least the 
greater and most important part of them. This method, according to Aristotle, can furnish 
a type of demonstration, certainly not so rigorous as scientific demonstration, but in any 
case sufficient for the needs of ethics2.
The endoxa are defined by Aristotle himself in the Topics as opinions shared (or sharable) 
by all, or by the majority of men, or by those who are competent, and among these either 
by all or the majority, or by the most renowned. These endoxa, that we will call endoxical 
(as opposed to paradoxical) views, that is commonly held in public opinion (en doxa) – 
always according to Aristotle –, function as premises for dialectic syllogisms, that is for 
those argumentations that are not properly demonstrative, in the scientific meaning of the 
term, because they do not begin with necessarily true premises, nor are “eristic” ones, that 
is those assumed merely in the spirit of competition, to prevail at all costs in a discussion, 
even by trickery. Dialectic arguments aim to refute, or to establish a thesis, by using fair, 
logically corrected means, beginning from premises shared by the interlocutor and thus 
producing conclusions the interlocutor will hold and share equally3.
3. Human Rights as Modern Endoxa
My thesis is that the function of what Aristotle called the endoxa  today can be performed 
by human rights, that is by the statements contained in the great declarations of rights 
found in national constitutional documents and in charters of the great international 
organizations, such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization 
of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, etc. In regard to the 
constitutional documents of the various states, there can be no doubt, having come into 
force, that they have been approved and so have received the consensus of the majority 
of the citizens or of their representatives and, in principle, must be accepted  by all their 
citizens. But also  international declarations, especially the Universal Declaration of the 
Human Rights approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, are 
expression of a broad consensus. Even if in fact it is true that there were fewer member-
states of the United Nations in 1948 than there are today, and if some (actually Saudi 
Arabia) have disassociated themselves, all the other states that have joined the organization 
since (today they are more than a hundred) have implicitly made the Declaration their 
own, and the states that may have had reservations about them for religious and cultural 
reasons have progressively moved closer to it.
2  Aristotle, Eth. Nic. VII 1, 1145 b 5-7.
3  Aristotle, Top. I 1, 100 a 1-b 25.
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I am referring in particular to several documents, such as the Universal Islamic 
Declaration of the Human Rights approved in 1981 by the Islamic Council for Europe, 
the Declaration of the Human Rights in Islam, approved by the Islamic Conference in 
1990, as well as the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights, approved in 1981 in 
Nairobi by the Organization of African Unity. The Islamic declarations, though founded 
on the divine law (the Sharî’a), in fact, incorporate the fundamental rights of the United 
Nations declaration, that is the right to personal safety, to freedom and to a dignified life; 
while the African declaration adds the rights of peoples to those of individuals, which are 
perfectly compatible with the contents of the Universal Declaration of the United Nations.
For these reasons, I think that today the declarations of human rights are shared, if not 
by all, certainly by the majority of men, and by the competent, who are the representatives 
of the citizens and the states, that is the politicians, or at least by the majority of them 
and the most renowned. Thus they correspond perfectly to the definition that Aristotle 
gave of the endoxa. Nor does oft heard objection or argument hold against them, that 
is the human rights, even if publicly proclaimed by all, are too often trampled by states 
which are members of the United Nations or by individual politicians, such as dictators, 
who govern within particular states. Unfortunately, it is true that human rights are still 
far from being respected for many individuals  and even peoples throughout the world. 
The testimony of this fact by humanitarians organizations, like Amnesty International, 
sometimes is shocking.
In any case when human rights are violated, this is denied, or it is done covertly; 
the perpetrators do not attempt to publicly justify such violations, rather they do it and 
energetically reject accusations that they do it. In all this obviously there is hypocrisy, but 
there is also a recognition that one cannot publicly take a position against human rights, 
because a similar position would be unpopular, it would have a price in consensus and 
definitively weaken its perpetrator. So even those who violate human rights recognize that 
they are widely shared and supported. Such recognitions undoubtedly confers them with 
a prestige that certainly opposition to or divergence from does not have. For these reasons, 
it can be said that human rights, even if more in theory than in practices, more officially 
than in daily action, are widely shared and so function as modern endoxa.
4. Human Rights and Public Ethics
If what was said above is true, then it is possible to use human rights as premises from 
which one can argue in order to build the fundamental rules of public ethics. Naturally 
one most account, as Aristotle suggests, for widely varying opinion, those that derive from 
various religions, cultures, ideologies; to determine their consequences, to evaluate their 
internal contradictions, and especially to check if they are compatible or not whit all the 
human rights, or at least with the most important ones, such as the right to life, equality, 
and freedom. The rules that are able to satisfy these requirements can furnish the basis for 
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draft legislation designed to secure consensus, and so to be translated into law, while those 
that are unable to secure consensus can be abandoned. In this way a corpus of rules shared, 
or sharable, by all can be assembled. 
A thesis of this type has been sustained by John Rawls in his important book, Political 
Liberalism, in which he has tried to find a happy median among the various ethical concepts 
that characterize pluralistic societies in what has been termed “overlapping consensus”, that 
is that part of values, or norms, that are common to all the various conceptions, even if 
they do not fully exhaust them, and so they allow other parts to survive that characterize 
more specifically and particularly various groups4. Naturally it is still possible that each of 
the conceptions is justified in different ways, for different reasons, the values that overlap 
with those of the other conceptions. This was already noted by Jacques Maritain in 1948 
discussing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, when he observed that one does 
not need to ask “why” individual states adhered to the declaration, because these “reasons 
why” would be varied and even contradictory; instead one needs to be satisfied with the 
“what”, that is with the fact that certain fundamental rights were points of convergence5.
If the function of human rights is to furnish the premises for arguments that lead to 
a public ethic, and thus to a legislation, which is able to obtain consensus, it is useless to 
ask “why”. This question is certainly of interest to philosophers, who are always looking 
for the reasons and the grounds of human rights, but it is completely irrelevant to practical 
ends, which are the only important ones from not only a political and legislative, but also 
an ethical point of view. Legislative assemblies, indeed, are not composed of philosophers, 
nor are the populations that they represent composed only of philosophers. The important 
thing is the dialectical use, that is the argumentation, that uses the human rights to 
convince others  of the goodness of certain solutions. For this end there is no need to go 
back to the foundations. We can be satisfied by reference to shared premises, that is the 
“greatest common denominator” that  forms the basis of the overlapping consensus, from 
which one can begin to deduce, or to argue, or refute the proposed solutions, leaving it to 
the philosophers to look for their foundations.
This is not to say that human rights will not prove themselves to be useful for the 
latter end, that is a philosophic use of human rights may be possible. Instead of going to 
their foundations, that is asking directly what human rights are based on, whether they 
are based on divine law, or a presumed natural law, or on the culture of some peoples, on 
history, etc., once again it is convenient to begin from human rights and proceed upwards, 
that is backwards, trying to discover what they imply, or what in reality they hide. In this 
way one will be able to, if not on a whole anthropology, at least to shed light on some great 
values implicit in the principal human rights, which is certainly of interest from a general 
philosophical point of view.
4  J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York 1993.
5  J. Maritain, Man and the State, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1951.
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Let’s cite a few examples. The equality invoked by all the declarations of rights, from 
the French declaration in 1789 to the universal declaration in 1948, when they affirm 
that, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”, it means that at 
least implicitly they recognize that there is something that links all human beings, despite 
differences of race, colour, gender, language, religion, national or social origin, wealth, etc. 
Well, this is what used to be called “human nature”, which is something modern philosophy 
does not want even to hear mentioned. Freedom of thought, of conscience, of religion, of 
the press, of association, that all democratic constitutions and all international declarations 
recognize, implicitly means that they recognize man’s ability to remove himself, at least 
in part, from the material influences to which they are subject (heredity, environment, 
education, sexual stimuli, conscious and unconscious psychological tendencies, social and 
economic influences), and this is what the ancients called a rational or spiritual nature.
Finally once the most contested of all rights, but today universally recognized, that is 
the right to property, that all the declarations from 1789 to 1948, have proclaimed (see 
Article 17: “Everyone has the right to own alone or in association with others. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property”), has profound philosophical implications. 
Because, indeed, it remains valid despite any change that occurs in the life of the individual, 
change of religion, of party, of opinion, of citizenship, it bears witness to the recognition 
of a permanent and immutable substrate in the individual, on which his personal identity 
depends. This corresponds to what ancient and medieval philosophers called “substance”, 
another term abhorred by modern philosophers but which has revealed itself to be 
indispensable in practical use.
If all the above mentioned implications are brought together, the result is that man 
is an individual substance with a rational nature, that is the result is none other than 
the definition of “person” proffered by Severinus Boethius (rationalis naturae individua 
substantia)6. Whit this observation I do not intend to hold, obviously, that today one 
can simply re-propose the classic definition of human being, without accounting for 
countless knowledge which has been acquired by scientific anthropology and modern and 
contemporary philosophy. Nor do I intend to hold that human rights form a complete 
ethical code containing the solution to all the new ethical problems raised by scientific 
and technological development. I hold simply that they are an extremely useful starting 
point, because of the wide-spread support which they enjoy, for who wants to go forward 
operatively with the search for sharable solutions, obviously through developing all the 
ethical implications contained in the provisions of human rights through argumentation, 
discussion, confrontation. What is the task of ethics as a philosophical discipline, if not to 
argue, discuss, and confront?
6  I developed this point more fully in the article, L’etica alla ricerca della persona, “Il Mulino”, 40 
(1991), pp. 579-588, reprinted in E. Berti, Soggetti di responsabilità. Questioni di filosofia pratica, 
Diabasis, Reggio Emilia 1993.
